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MICHAEL S. JONES

In Defence of Reason in Religion

Introduction
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In his article, «In Defense of Reason in Religion,» Jones
reacts to current trends to minimize the role of reason in
religion by attempting to show that if religionists desire
their religious beliefs to correspond to knowledge, the
noetic tool most likely to achieve this goal is reason. This
he does by reviewing the leading epistemological approaches to metaphysical knowledge, and showing that
each relies to some extent on reason. He further argues
that all of them must utilize reason if they wish to attempt to critically verify their findings. Then he argues
that religious knowledge is a type of metaphysical knowledge. He shows that the leading approaches to obtaining
religious knowledge parallel the various approaches to
metaphysical knowledge, and have similar reliance on
reason. Even in the case of supernatural revelation, reason is used in identifying and interpreting the revelation.
Therefore, Jones concludes, «reason is the primary
mechanism for obtaining religious knowledge.»
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he religions of humanity are a multisplendored thing. The diversity of human cul
ture both in history and at this present time
has produced a correspondingly diverse array of religious beliefs. Some beliefs are ubiquitous among the
worlds religions. Many beliefs supplied by one religion
are complimentary to the beliefs of other religions, supplying theological information which may be missing or
overlooked by the latter religions. At times even the beliefs of different religions which seem to contradict
each other may be shown to be merely different perceptions of the same reality, brought about by differing
cultural contexts.1
At other times theologians and philosophers of religion are unable to achieve reconciliation between conflicting truth claims of different religions. There are
times when the acceptance of conflicting truth claims
from two religious systems would constitute a violation
123

of the principle of non-contradiction. In such cases
only one of the competing claims can be true. Furthermore, many thinkers openly oppose the truth claims of
all religion, positing various doctrines of irreligion as
truth.
The dilemma of how one determines which truth
claim is in fact true is the subject of this paper. Various
mechanisms for obtaining religious knowledge have
been suggested and applied during the long history of
religion. The thesis of this paper is that reason is the
primary mechanism for obtaining religious
knowledge\theological truth. Furthermore, this paper
will support the belief that reason is the most reliable
mechanism for obtaining religious knowledge; that is,
religious beliefs acquired using reason are the religious
beliefs which are the most likely to be true.
Every thinker has epistemological assumptions, this
writer included. These assumptions include some very
important beliefs about the proper nature of a noetic
structure. While this paper is not intended as an essay
on epistemology, the subject at hand is very epistemological. The writer believes that the mechanism of acquiring knowledge which is recommended in this paper
is compatible with a variety of noetic structures, including varieties of foundationalism and coherentism.

A. Belief
Antony Flew defines belief as, The epistemic attitude of holding a proposition p to be true... and
makes the important observation that ...while knowing
p would generally be considered to entail, among
other things, that p is true, believing p is consistent
with the actual falsity of p.2 A persons beliefs may
be held on a variety of psychological basis. One might
believe a proposition without the slightest evidence for
the truthfulness of that proposition.

B. Faith
Discussions of religious knowledge often assume
the form of a contrast between faith and reason. Reason has been defined as ...the natural ability of the human mind to discover truth.3 This definition seems
adequate. Crafting a definition of faith is more difficult.
Voltaire used two definitions for faith, one for belief in
things which he (Voltaire) personally believed and another for belief in things which he deemed incredible.4
This definitional dichotomy points toward the tension
that underlies the faith/reason contrast. This tension
arises from an important question regarding religious
knowledge: is it possible to obtain knowledge of the
metaphysical without utilizing reason?
The Reformation view of faith seems to adequately
describe the necessary components of faith; understanding, assent, and trust.5 Thus faith is trust in someDiscussion
thing (or someone) which is believed (believed in).6 If,
I. The concept of knowledge distinguished from the as Flew pointed out (above), beliefs can be held regardless of the truthfulness of the proposition believed,
concepts of belief and faith.
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there is a strong possibility that a person of faith may
be trusting something which is not, in fact, true.
C. Knowledge
Knowledge may be defined as apprehension of
truth.7 When taken in this sense, knowledge is that set
of beliefs in which the propositions which are believed
are in fact true. A person may not be able to distinguish
between those of his beliefs which constitute knowledge and those which are erroneous, but this distinction is of great theoretical importance. If a persons
faith is based upon knowledge it will not be the case
that person is trusting something which is not, in fact,
true.

But not all methods are created equal. Because
knowledge acquisition involves belief formation, the intent of this paper is to defend a mechanism of belief
formation which is designed to maximize objectivity
and therefore increase the likelihood that ones beliefs
will qualify as knowledge.
II. Reason is the principle mechanism for obtaining
knowledge of the metaphysical.9

A. The Many Ways of Obtaining Knowledge
Many methods of acquiring knowledge have been
suggested in the course of philosophical history. The
most significant are discussed below, with the excepD. Significance
tion of scepticism, which is more a method of quesMuch of the discussion concerning faith and reason tioning beliefs. Each method emphasizes one mechahas centered around the justifiability (or rationality) of
nism of knowledge acquisition. Often, the competing
beliefs. But, as George Mavrodes points out, ...claimmethods have been portrayed by their advocates as muing a belief to be rational...isnt really claiming much.... tually exclusive. More recently the trend has been toA belief can be rationally justifiable and the proposition ward combining approaches. The sixth method disbelieved still be false.8 What most people want to know cussed, rational empiricism, is an example of this. The
is whether a proposition is true; whether their beliefs
phenomenon of combining approaches is due to the
constitute knowledge; whether their faith is grounded
fact that each method is uniquely suited to obtaining
in truth. This paper is not concerned with how people
knowledge in a specific field.10
form the subjective opinions which are commonly
1. authoritarianism (faith)
called beliefs. This paper is concerned with what is the
Authoritarianism is, perhaps, responsible for more
most reliable mechanism for acquiring knowledge.
human beliefs than any other means of attaining knowlPeople utilize many methods of belief formation, often edge. One tends to believe what one is told unless one
without intentionally patronizing one method or anhas reason to do otherwise. This is especially true when
other.
the authority is one who has some special claim to
JSRI



N o.

1/Spring

2002

125

credibility, such as expertise in the field in question or a
reputation for reliability. Authority is an important
source of beliefs because the knowledge that each individual is able to attain through other methods is limited
by the limitations on human experience, including the
brevity of life. Authority is the primary source for
knowledge about the past.
There are limitations to authoritarianism. As a
method, it is limited to bringing new knowledge to individuals. It cannot bring new knowledge to humanity. It
has no way of resolving conflicts between authorities
without going outside the system. And the testimony of
any authority must eventually be grounded in some
more direct source of knowledge.11
2. mysticism (intuition)
Reality consists of more than just the physical world
and the world of reason. If reality transcends either of
these components, which the existence of the other
component proves true, then reality might transcend
both. But how can one gain knowledge of other aspects
of reality, and of the synthetic whole? Mystics propose
that humans have a capacity to intuitively know that
which transcends the senses and reason.12 It is this intuition which gives one a sense for intangibles such as
aesthetics.13
But knowledge claims derived from mysticism are
so personal that they are impossible to test for accuracy. The increasing understanding of psychology has
rendered it possible to explain some of the intuitive understandings of mysticism in terms of other more objective epistemologies.
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3. pragmatism
According to pragmatism, ideas are instruments to
help a person adjust to his environment. In a constantly
changing environment there are no final solutions.
Ideas must change as the problems they address
change. As long as an idea works, it is considered true;
if it ceases to work it will be considered false and discarded.14 The workability of an idea both tests and ultimately constitutes its truth.15 Pragmatism is a very
useful test of validity, especially in areas where universal
or normative principles due not apply. Pragmatism factors heavily in the makeup of American mentality. But
pragmatism has some very evident weaknesses. Pragmatism fosters a very narrow view of knowledge: only
practical knowledge is considered true knowledge. And
there are many examples of things which work which
are not true.
4. empiricism (experience)
Empiricism is the thesis that all knowledge (of matters of fact, as distinguished from that of logical relations between concepts) is based on experience.16
Consciousness of something constitutes a direct awareness which is beyond ones own control and is not questionable or in need of justification in terms of anything
else.17
Experience is the ultimate source for a great deal of
information concerning things external to a person, especially knowledge of the physical world. Empiricism is
not useful in acquiring knowledge in many metaphysical
areas of inquiry, such as memory or emotion. In those
areas where empiricism could be useful it must be kept
126

in mind that sensory data is always received through an
interpretive framework which may unconsciously bias
the way such data is perceived. Empiricism provides no
way af resolving conflicts caused by conflicting experiences. Worst of all, ones senses are not always reliable,
even when one thinks that they are.
5. classical rationalism (reason)
Rationalism is the belief that it is possible to obtain
by reason alone a knowledge of what exists.18 Beliefs
are deductively justified by beginning with one or more
necessary (indubitable) premises which are then elaborated in a succession of clear, logical steps which lead to
the desired conclusion.19 Reason is the source of
knowledge concerning mathematics, logic, and universals.
It is the faculty by which one determines the validity
of information proposed by the other methods of
knowledge acquisition.20 But the number of indubitable first premises is immensely insufficient to justify
the number of beliefs which have become the stock of
human intellectual trade. Furthermore, logical deductions which seem valid to one person are not always
clear to others. 6. rational empiricism (reason and experience)
Rational empiricism suggests that knowledge is obtained by ascertaining empirical data which is then manipulated using inductive principles, yielding probable
facts about that which is beyond ones experience.21
Rational empiricism is useful for knowing a much
broader range of subjects than either pure rationalism
or empiricism. But it does not overcome the second
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and fourth criticisms leveled at empiricism, that all sensory experience is perceived through a preexisting interpretive framework, and that ones senses may not be as
reliable as one is prone to thinking they are. Furthermore, rational empiricism suffers the shortcoming if induction, that the argument rests on the strength of the
analogy between the original empirical data and the ultimate conclusion, the strength of which is difficult to
asses.22
B. The Primacy of Reason
1. the ubiquity of reason
It seems that all knowledge is in some way related
to reason. All of the methods of obtaining knowledge
which are mentioned in II,A, utilize reason at some
point. Authoritar-ianism utilizes reason to identify,
choose between, interpret, synthesize, and apply authorities. Mysticism looks to reason to recognize intuitions, to objectify the knowledge supplied by intuition,
and to reconcile or judge between conflicting intuitions.
Pragmatism relies on reason to evaluate the ever-changing environment, to formulate ideas, and to assess the
relative success or failure of ideas. Empiricism resorts
to reason to systemize and interpret sense data, to reconcile conflicting data, and to continually evaluate the
functionality of the sensory apparatus. Reason is openly
the mechanism of rationalism.
Ironically, most philosophers who have disparaged
reason have used reason in their arguments. Similarly,
the alternative mechanisms of knowledge acquisition
reviewed above utilize reason to argue their position.
127

2. the necessity of reason
Any of the various mechanisms of knowledge acquisition can provide truth. But all rely on reason to
verify their conclusion. Only reason is self-critical. Utilizing reason one can check the results of the reasoning
process. The degree of certainty that ones beliefs constitute knowledge can only be measure by the reasons
one has for holding that belief. Beliefs must be justified
according to reason. Reason has a preeminent epistemological status based on its potential for objectivity
and testability.
Reason plays an important negative role in belief
justification. Some types of beliefs are subject to verification but not falsification (for example, beliefs about
existence). Others are potentially falsifiable rather than
verifiable (such as universal claims).23 Beliefs which are
falsifiable are not justified and do not constitute knowledge, since they are not true. One must exercise reason
in order to ...bring it about that there is no proposition
which he believes for which he has adequate reason to
refrain.24
The use of reason is a necessity for any thinking
person to have lasting conviction about a belief. Less
contraspective persons and obscurantists may be able
to steadfastly maintain belief (whether true or misguided) without a firm foundation of reason. But a
thinker will eventually find reasons to deviate on his
own, or succumb to anothers suggestion. An ungrounded belief is easily swayed and abandoned, even
though it might be correct. Only when we have provided warrant for our beliefs can we avoid changing our
minds irrationally or believing irresponsibly.25
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Reason is necessary because of the previously described distinction between knowledge and belief. Belief is nothing more than opinion. Knowledge is true; it
is belief which accurately apprehends reality. Beliefs are
formed a multitude of ways. Some mechanisms of belief formation yield more false (inaccurate) beliefs than
true (accurate). If one desires his beliefs to constitute
knowledge one must patronize the mechanisms of belief formation which are most likely to yield true beliefs.
III. Religious knowledge must be obtained using the
methods and mechanisms utilized to obtain knowledge
of the metaphysical.
A. Religion as Metaphysics
Religion is difficult to succinctly define. Religion
has so many forms throughout the world that any brief
definition will exclude aspects essential to some of the
worlds religions.26 In general, religion may be described as an integrated system of expressing belief in
and reverence for a supernatural power or powers.27 It
is often asserted that the object of religious belief is supernatural; it exists outside the natural world. It could
also be observed that it is metaphysical; the object of
religious belief transcends (but does not necessarily exclude) physical experience. Therefore, religious knowledge must be obtained using methods for obtaining
knowledge of the metaphysical.28
As section II has shown, reason is the prime
mechanism utilized in obtaining knowledge of the
metaphysical. Religious knowledge, being a type of
128

metaphysical knowledge, must also be obtained by using reason.

thority is not proven but assumed. Fideists assert that
essential religious doctrines cannot be established by
rational means, but only accepted...by ...faith.31 Faith
B. Reason an Essential Element of Natural Theology
is regarded as the first axiom of ones religious system.
Natural theology is the attempt to demonstrate the As in authoritarianism, fideism provides no means of
existence of God (or other religious doctrine) from pre- resolving conflicts between authorities without going
mises provided by observation of the ordinary course
outside the system, which usually involves a resort to
of nature.29 Classical attempts, such as Aquinas argureason. As in authoritarianism, fideism must utilize reament from design and Anshelms ontological argument, son to choose between, interpret, synthesize, and apply
have recognized that reason is essential to gain knowlauthorities. And the testimony of any authority must
edge of metaphysical religious truths. They would agree eventually be grounded in some more direct source of
with Locks analysis, Faith is nothing but a species of
knowledge.32 As Pannenberg pointed out, ...logically
reason...a chain of arguments...was... employed in disknowledge is the presupposed basis or ground of
covering the principles of theology, natural or retrust33, and ...as trust requires knowledge as its basis,
vealed.30
although it goes beyond knowledge, so faith requires
Some philosophers and theologians have suggested reason as its basis, although it goes beyond reason.34
that the finite human intellect is not up to the task of
If faith is a first axiom, how can one determine
searching out a potentially infinite religious truth.
whether ones faith is in the correct object? How can
They have attempted to find ways of obtaining reli- one who holds the wrong first axiom determine that is
gious knowledge which are not dependant on reason.
so, and proceed to change first axioms?
Following are the major approaches to natural theol2. basicality (intuition)
ogy. They correspond, roughly, to the ways of obtainMany philosophers have noted that at the base of a
ing knowledge discussed in II,A. Here, as in II,A, it will persons noetic structure lies certain beliefs which are
be seen that none successfully divorces itself from deneither verifiable nor falsifiable, but are known intupendency upon reason.
itively. These beliefs have usually been limited to self1. fideism (authority)
evident propositions and incorrigible observations. ReFideism can be defined a variety of ways. Basicality, cently this list has been expanded to include certain
discussed below, may be considered another form of
memory propositions, certain propositions about other
fideism. Here fideism signifies acceptance of a belief
minds, and certain ethical/moral propositions.35 To
based on trust in an authority (sacred writings, a relithis list of basic or foundational beliefs some philosogious organization, etc.) where the reliability of the au- phers add belief in God.36
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With this approach it is believed that theistic belief
is placed beyond the reach of doubt. But this is not entirely so; a person can come to disagree with a basic belief and it can subsequently be modified (albeit with
considerable difficulty). Furthermore, a beliefs being
basic does not guarantee that it will be held strongly.37
More seriously, as in mysticism, the high degree of subjectivity involved in basicality provides no means of
testing beliefs for accuracy.38 Basic beliefs can be erroneous.
Basicality does not entirely escape dependance on
reason. As with mysticism, basicality looks to reason to
recognize intuitions, to objectify the knowledge supplied by intuition, and to reconcile or judge between
conflicting intuitions. Advocates of basicality utilize
reason in formulating their theory and to defend it.
3. presuppositionalism (pragmatism)
The term presuppositionalism is used to signify a
variety of approaches to theistic knowledge or theistic
belief. Here it is used to signify that method of knowledge acquisition which posits theistic belief as a heuristic principle and then tests the resulting noetic structure
for internal consistency.
Presuppositionalists propose that only by positing
the existence of a supreme being can a consistent system of beliefs account for all reality. ...only if the basic
truths that we learn immediately by being open to
Gods
Word are added to our basic beliefs will we find adequate explanation to confirm such basic beliefs as our
belief in the relationships of subject and object.39
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Thus a belief constitutes knowledge only if it works
in a given system, and only if the system works as a
whole. Using this test of internal consistency (non-contradiction), competing beliefs and systems can be
evaluated.Although internal consistency is certainly desirable, it seems insufficient as a test of truth. The problems with presuppositionalism are similar to the problems of pragmatism. A belief can be knowledge without
fitting consistently into a persons overall belief system,
in the case where there are other problems with that
belief system. And it seems possible to have a system of
beliefs which is thoroughly consistent but based on erroneous premises and therefore containing false beliefs.
Furthermore, the task of achieving a perfectly consistent system, while perhaps a worthy goal, is certainly
very daunting, a task that is probably beyond present
human ability.
Besides the ever present need of reason to formulate and defend any system of belief,
presuppositionalism relies on reason in several other
key areas. Presuppositionalism relies on reason to understand noetic systems, to formulate systems, and to
assess the relative success or failure of a system when
tested with non-contradiction.
4. the anthropological approach (experience)
The anthropological approach to vindicating religious belief proposes that the universal occurrence of
religious belief among diverse cultures the world over
supports belief in the divine. In this it is similar to empiricism in basing belief on subjective human experience. Consciousness of the Divine constitutes a direct
130

awareness which is beyond ones own control and is
not questionable or in need of justif-ication in terms of
anything else. The anthropological approach suffers the
same weaknesses as does empiricism.
Experiences are always perceived through an interpretive framework which may unconsciously bias the
way they are interpreted. Ones senses are not always
reliable, even when one thinks that they are. And the
anthropological approach provides no way of resolving
conflicts caused by conflicting experiences. The anthropological approach relies on reason to formulate and
defend religious experience as a method of validating
religious belief. It also uses reason to systemize and interpret religious experiences, to reconcile conflicting
data, and to continually evaluate the functionality and
objectivity of the experiential apparatus.
5. evidentialism (reason)
In contrast to the preceding methods of natural theology, evidentialism emphasizes the need for external
evidence to validate all religious knowledge claims.
...theology, as is the case with any science, must admit
that if its statements are uncheckable, they are meaningless.40 This evidence may be a deductive argument attempting to decisively prove the existence of the Divine
(such as the ontological argument). Or it may be inductive, leading to a probable conclusion concerning divine
existence (such as arguments from history). It may attempt to make its case using pure reason beginning
from a basic first premise, or it may utilize a form of rational empiricism in building its case upon widely accepted non-basic beliefs. An advantage to the
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evidentialist approach is that it does not try to mask its
use of reason, as the other approaches sometimes try to
do. But the pure reason approach suffers the same limitations as does classical rationalism as an epistemological method. The limited number of indubitable first
premises limits the number of arguments possible. But
if deductively proving the existence of Divinity is ones
goal, only one successful argument is necessary. Some
believe that they have obtained this goal, but unfortunately logical deductions which seem valid to one person are not always clear to others. Further, it has been
pointed out that basing ones belief in God upon rational arguments leaves one open to apostasy when ones
arguments are overthrown.41
If one opts for some version of the rational-empiricist approach, one must be wary that one is not working from false first premises. Furthermore, many have
objected that probable belief is not sufficient for religious faith.42 Others have responded that probability is
the basis of most human belief and is adequate in the
case of religion.43 George Mavrodes makes the significant observation that there seems to be a natural human disposition to hold life-orienting beliefs
strongly, whether they are based on evidence or basic.44 And, as Pannenberg points out, ...trust can exist
in the expectation that knowledge will be disclosed.45
C. Reason Essential to Identify and Understand Supernatural Revelation
Revealed theology is religious belief based upon Divine revelation. Such revelation would provide sure
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premises from which theological knowledge may be derived. But with the many contradictory authorities
claiming to be Divine revelation one is forced to utilize
reason in an attempt to determine which is authentic.
As Locke stated, Though faith be founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us, yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth
of its being a divine revelation greater than our own
(rationally acquired) knowledge; since the whole
strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge
that God revealed it.46
The only alternative is fideism, the problems of
which are discussed in III,B,1. After one has selected a
revelation (through whatever means) one is necessarily
faced with the task of interpreting it before one can understand it. Even the most simple communication is
subject to a variety of interpretations. Choosing the
correct or best interpretation again requires the exercise
of reason.

Conclusion

proposition is true; whether their beliefs constitute
knowledge; whether their faith is grounded in truth.
This paper has sought to demonstrate that reason is
the primary mechanism for obtaining religious knowledge. It has done this by first defining knowledge as
apprehension of truth, in distinction from belief and
faith. Then it discussed the primary methods of obtaining metaphysical knowledge, indicating how each was
dependant upon reason to some degree and suggesting
that reason is the mechanism responsible for the objectivity and reliability of each method. Next it was seen
that religious knowledge, being metaphysical, must be
obtained using these same methods and mechanisms. A
review of the major approaches to natural theology indicated that each approach was analogous to one of the
previously discussed methods of obtaining metaphysical knowledge, and was dependant on reason in the
same manner. Finally, it was seen that even when truth
is revealed supernaturally, reason is required for
humans to apprehend it.
n

Unquestionably, one can hold religious beliefs without
exercising reason, consciously or unconsciously. ...psychologically one can believe...without having established by reason the truth of the matter...in fact, many
persons have neither the time nor the competence to
establish by reason the truth of the matter.47 But as
was pointed out earlier in distinguishing between belief
and knowledge, most people want to know whether a
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